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Abstract: Americans have a tough time saving for their retirement.  To make matters worse, 
the move from defined benefit (DB) plans that are regulated by ERISA to defined 
contribution (DC) plans over recent decades has required greater investor sophistication, 
discipline, and sound investment advice.  Unfortunately, even the most recent regulation 
regarding investment advice for DC plans does not address the two critical deficiencies of 
the current system, namely opacity and conflicts of interest.  We propose that a one-
principal standard be instituted along with strict transparency requirements to control the 
conflicts of interest and improve retirement savings advice.  We also recommend that only 
low-cost, passive, well-diversified index funds for stocks and bonds should qualify as 
retirement vehicles to address concerns regarding opacity. 
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 2 
Introduction 
Designing sensible retirement-plan rules is a challenging task since most 
Americans do not have sufficient financial acumen and self-discipline to manage their own 
retirement portfolio.  In spite of the fact that retirement plans constitute the bulk of their 
savings, most American families struggle with the management of defined contribution 
(DC) plans. Consequently their savings are inadequate to meet their retirement needs.  
According to a recent report, 56% of Americans have less than $10,000 in their retirement 
accounts.  One in three Americans reported that they had no retirement savings.1  Clearly, 
the current DC plans for retirement savings are not working very well for the typical 
American.  In this paper, we analyze simple and sensible rules that can help every 
American family get the most out of its DC retirement plan. 
Since 1975, a structural change has occurred in our private retirement system away 
from defined benefit (DB) plans and into DC plans which include self-directed Keogh and 
IRAs, and employer-sponsored 401(k) and 403(b) plans.  DC plans provide tax-advantaged 
retirement savings vehicles for individuals and typically represent a large portion of the 
individual’s savings.  At the end of 2015, DC plan assets alone totaled $6.7 trillion.2  This 
massive shift from DB plans to DC plans has increased the urgency and importance of both 
transparency and sound investment advice regarding retirement savings. 
One of the impediments for inadequate retirement savings in DC plans is the poor 
performance of trillions of dollars of investments in DC plans.3  The poor performance 
                                                        
1  Elyssa Kirkham, 1 in 3 Americans Have Saved $0 for Retirement, Time (Mar. 14, 2016), 
http://time.com/money/4258451/retirement-savings-survey/. 
2 See 2016 Investment Company Factbook, http://www.icifactbook.org/ch7/16_fb.  
3 During 1990-2012, the geometric average annual return of DC plans was 2.7 percentage points lower than 
equity returns and 2.8 percentage points lower than long-term corporate bond returns.  DC plans also returned 
0.7 percentage points less than DB plans. See Alcia Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, and Caroline Crawford, 
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itself is a consequence of the lack of investor sophistication, discipline, as well as the 
complexity of the investment instruments and investment concepts.  Another critical factor 
that compounded the problem was that regulations did not require investment advice to be 
in the best interest of the plan beneficiaries.   
To address these serious and growing problems, policy makers have targeted the 
‘suitability rule’ in providing investment advice.  Under Department of Labor’s (DOL) 
recently adopted new rule,4 brokers/investment advisers for DC retirement accounts would 
be subject to a higher fiduciary standard and investment advisers must recommend 
investment products with the “best interest” of the beneficiaries in mind.  The new rule is 
prima facie laudable.  However, there are two provisions in the recently instituted standard 
that undermine its primary intent of ensuring that investors get unbiased investment advice 
at a reasonable cost.  The first one allows brokers and investment advisers to receive 
compensation such as commissions from financial institutions whose products they 
recommend for inclusion in the investors’ retirement portfolio.  By allowing advisers to 
receive compensation from both the buyer (investor) and the seller (financial institution), 
                                                        
Investment Returns: Defined Benefit Vs. Defined Contribution Plans, Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College, December 2015, Number 15-21. 
4 Under the DOL's definition, any individual receiving compensation for providing advice that is 
individualized or specifically directed to a particular plan sponsor (e.g., an employer with a retirement 
plan), plan participant, or Individual Retirement Account (IRA) owner for consideration in making a 
retirement investment decision is a fiduciary. Such decisions can include, but are not limited to, what assets 
to purchase or sell and whether to rollover from an employer-based plan to an IRA. The fiduciary can be a 
broker, registered investment adviser, insurance agent, or other type of adviser (together referred to as 
"advisers" here). Some of these advisers are subject to federal securities laws and some are not. Being a 
fiduciary simply means that the adviser must provide impartial advice in their client's best interest and 
cannot accept any payments creating conflicts of interest unless they qualify for an exemption intended to 
assure that the customer is adequately protected. DOL's regulatory impact analysis estimates that the rule 
and related exemptions would save investors over $40 billion over ten years, even if one focuses on just 
one subset of transactions that have been the most studied. The real savings from this new rule are likely 
much larger as conflicts and their effects are both pervasive and well hidden.  See Department of Labor 
Proposes Rule to Address Conflicts of Interest in Retirement Advice, Saving Middle-Class Families Billions 
of Dollars Every Year, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsconflictsofinterest.html.  
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this provision creates an obvious conflict of interest between the investor and the adviser. 
Furthermore, these fees get passed on to the investor reducing the net returns.5  
The second provision of concern allows brokers/advisers to include proprietary 
products (privately owned, nontraded assets, also referred to as alternative investments) in 
the retirement portfolio.  These products are also allowed in Defined Benefit (DB) plans.  
They suffer from greater informational asymmetry, with the seller holding an informational 
advantage, and have complex features that are difficult for the average investor to 
understand and analyze.  There is considerable evidence that the average investor is not as 
financially sophisticated as she needs to be to evaluate non-traded retirement assets.  
Moreover, proprietary products and alternative investments are also likely to involve 
higher transaction costs.  While either of the two issues of informational asymmetry and 
complexity is sufficient to put the investor at a significant disadvantage, the combination 
compounds the problem.  The above two provisions in combination exacerbate the concern 
that investors’ might not get sound advice: brokers/advisers who receive compensation 
from institutions have a greater incentive to recommend costly alternative investments and 
proprietary products that earn them greater commissions.  In summary, the provisions that 
create potential conflicts of interest between advisers and investors are further compounded 
by allowing non-traded proprietary products and alternative investments. 
The relevant policy question is how significant these issues are.  That is, are these 
potential conflicts of interest likely to result in significant losses to investors due to poor 
advice?  And does the lack of transparency in proprietary products have adverse 
                                                        
5 See Ian Ayers and Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and 
“Dominated Funds” in 401 (k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476-1550 (2015) 
 5 
consequences to investors?  In this paper we provide evidence that the answer is “yes” to 
both questions.  
To answer the first question on the effect of conflict of interest, we choose a unique 
setting in which a similar potential conflict of interest exists: namely, DB pension funds 
that were already subject to the fiduciary standard under ERISA.  We analyze the 
performance of DB pension funds in which an executive of the firm that employs the 
beneficiaries is also a fiduciary.  Such a set up creates a conflict of interest with fiduciary-
executive required to serve two principals: the beneficiaries of the DB fund and the 
shareholders of the firm.  
Our evidence indicates that a simple requirement that investment advisers be 
subject to the fiduciary standard (under ERISA) does not by itself address the conflict of 
interest issue in DB pension funds: in funds with conflicts of interest, beneficiaries are 
short-changed for the benefit of the shareholders.  Returns from insider trades of pension 
funds in which conflicts of interest are likely to be present underperform the market by 
more than 5.5% over a year.  This figure understates the loss to plan beneficiaries: returns 
from insider trades in general outperform the market. This loss is significantly greater than 
the figures reported by others using different methods.6  Based on this experience of DB 
pension funds, we can conclude that the effect of conflict of interest is real, is much bigger 
than previously documented, and will very likely be to the detriment of the beneficiaries 
of the DC plans as well.  Therefore, without addressing the cause of the conflict of interest 
                                                        6 See Alcia Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, and Caroline Crawford, Investment Returns: Defined Benefit Vs. 
Defined Contribution Plans, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, December 2015, Number 
15-21; and Jason Furman & Betsy Stevenson, The Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement 
Savings, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/23/effects-
conflicted-investment-advice-retirement-savings. 
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issue, the current rules for DC plans are unlikely to be successful in addressing the issue of 
inadequate retirement savings. 
To address the second question regarding non-traded alternative assets and 
proprietary products, we consider two representative products that would continue to be 
allowed as appropriate retirement investments.  We simulate the performance of these 
products and find that, on a risk-adjusted basis, the performance is inferior compared to 
both the risk-free rate (Ten-Year Treasury Notes) and S&P 500.  Hence our evidence 
suggests that without also addressing the transparency problem, the fiduciary standard rule 
for DC plans is not likely to be successful. 
The empirical evidence in this paper shows that the current investment advisory 
rules are deficient.  On the one hand, the current rules require that brokers/investment 
advisers act in the best interest of the beneficiaries, yet they allow them to receive income 
from third parties.  In addition, the rules do not prohibit opaque, non-traded alternative 
investments and proprietary products, which would lead to uninformed and costly 
investment decisions.  In fact, the current rules are likely to lead to continued conflicted 
investment advice, confusion, and wide-spread litigation to sort out these internal conflicts 
in a multi-trillion-dollar market.7  We offer three policy recommendations to remedy these 
problems. 
                                                        7 The new rules have already created a wave of lawsuits regarding conflicts of interests and opacity in defined 
contribution plans.  See for instance Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2016, “Self-Dealing with 401 (k),” and 
Wall Street Journal, September 14, 2016, “MIT, NYU, Yale Sued over Retirement-Plan Fes.” Also see, Wall 
Street Journal, September 7, 2016, “Wall Street Remakes the CD, Hitting Yields.” Furthermore, U.S. 
Supreme Court recently ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs in 401(k) plans and rejected a strict six-year statute of 
limitations to bring lawsuit.  See, http://www.wsj.com/articles/high-court-ruling-adds-protections-for-
investors-in-401 (k)plans-1431974139 
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Our first policy recommendation addresses the current rule that allows 
brokers/advisers to receive income both from the investor as well as the sponsor of the 
investment product.  Any serious reform in retirement investment area must address the 
conflict of interest problem caused by this income exemption rule.  The key to eliminating 
conflicts of interest involves insuring that the brokers/investment advisers serve, and 
therefore receive income from, only one principal.  Unfortunately, the current advisory 
rules and the associated exemptions simply fail to address the multiple-masters problem.   
Second, any serious reform must prohibit non-traded alternative investments and 
proprietary investment vehicles from the menu of investments in retirement plans because 
of the lack of transparency which impedes informed decisions by beneficiaries.  As we 
show, these non-traded investment vehicles are likely to provide lower returns thereby 
reducing the retirement savings of beneficiaries.  Furthermore, we show that by using non-
traded products in retirement accounts, certain wealthy taxpayers can avoid paying any 
taxes on their income.  Thus, allowing alternative and proprietary investment products into 
retirement accounts does not make any sense either from the average beneficiary 
perspective or a public policy perspective.  We recommend a very strict transparency rule 
in order for any investment to qualify as a retirement asset for both DB and DC plans: All 
qualified retirement equity securities must be publicly traded in U.S. public exchanges or 
over-the-counter market in case of notes and bonds. 
Our final recommendation is that only passive index funds or well-diversified 
exchange traded funds (ETFs) consisting of broadly diversified portfolios (such as ETFs 
that track the Standard and Poor’s 500 index) be allowed the tax exemption as retirement 
accounts.  It is our view that simply requiring a fiduciary standard in itself is not going to 
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solve retirement savings problems.  Instead, it is likely to lead to additional problems by 
creating an inconsistent set of rules. Our recommendation of limiting retirement accounts 
to index funds will prevent conflicts of interests and lack of transparency from creeping 
back into the retirement-advice business.  To this end, we further recommend the 
establishment of broad age-based minimum, maximum, and target percentages of common 
stocks, corporate and government bonds, and real-estate securities that can be held in DC 
plans.  Anyone requiring an exception to the well-diversified ETF rule would need to be 
qualified on the basis of financial education or size of retirement assets.  The restriction to 
limit investment choices to passive funds will also increase investor returns by reducing 
the fees charged by financial institutions. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 1 provides the 
historical context in which the shift from DB to DC plans took place and provides a 
comparison of the two types of plans. Section 2 describes the fiduciary standard and 
analyzes conflict of interest problem in the context of corporate-sponsored pension funds. 
Section 3 uses the evidence of conflict of interest in DB plans to provide an insight to the 
likely effect of the potential conflict of interest in DC plans. Section 4 explains the 
problems with allowing proprietary products in pension funds and provides evidence of the 
harm it can cause investors. Section 5 describes the policy recommendations to resolve the 
potential conflicts of interest in individual retirement accounts. In Section 6, we present the 
paper’s conclusions. 
1. The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution 
In this section we review the factors that caused the shift from DB to DC plans and 
the pros and cons of each type of plan. 
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a. Historical Background 
For decades, Americans saved for their retirement using employer-sponsored 
pension plans.8  Under this system, the employers bore the burden of managing the assets 
prudently because the employers promised the employee specific benefits.  The 
beneficiaries did not need to be financially savvy and yet enjoyed the stability and security 
of retirement income. 
After World War II, employers began to offer pension plans to their employees; 
and they used these benefits to compete for the best employees.9  Americans began to 
expect these benefits as they became increasingly popular.10  Older Americans remember 
retirement plans where they received a fixed income after retirement, but only if they stayed 
with an employer for many decades.11  The plan, used by the majority of Americans in 
previous generations, is a DB plan.  The plan is a defined-benefit plan because the benefit 
– the money paid out of the pension – is set by a tenure/salary calculation.  
While secure and convenient, the old system eventually came under pressure. One 
issue was that employers were burdened with future retirement liabilities that were beyond 
their control and that created significant uncertainty in the marketplace. Also some firms 
deliberately underfunded their pension plans or went bankrupt.  To deal with firms that 
failed, the federal government created the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) 
that took over the pension liabilities of failed firms, thus transferring the risk and 
responsibility of the retirement plans to the U.S. taxpayers.  The second issue was that 
                                                        
8 See, Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 460-62 (2004). 
9 See Dennis Triplett, The Great Shift: Moving from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution, THE INSTITUTE 
FOR HEALTHCARE CONSUMERISM (2016). 
10 Id. at A1. 
11 See, e.g., Leora Friedberg, Not Your Father’s Pension Plan, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
(Jan. 2002), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/02/01/23-34Friedberg.pdf. 
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Americans began changing jobs frequently. Consequently, shorter work tenure often meant 
that the employee did not qualify for any retirement benefits at all.  Finally, shorter tenures 
also meant that American were burdened with the task of having to keep track of multiple 
streams of benefits.12   
To deal with these problems, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
enacted in 1974, popularized DC pension plans and changed the American retirement 
system permanently.13  Following the passage of ERISA, employers shifted employees 
from the traditional DB plans to employer-sponsored 401(k) and 403(b) plans 14or the DC 
plans, in which the contributions to the retirement plan was set in advance, but the ultimate 
value at the time of retirement depended on the performance of the assets held in the plan.  
Therein lay the danger of DC plans.  Unless the retirement savings and investments were 
managed competently, most Americans could end up in their old age with little savings and 
at the mercy of various social safety-net programs, such as Social Security or Medicaid, 
which are only meant to be supplementary retirement vehicles.  
Several actions by ERISA increased the popularity of the DC plans, from the point 
of view of both employers and beneficiaries.  The increased regulatory burden imposed on 
DB plans made the DC option more appealing to employers: they simply shifted the 
                                                        
12 See, e.g., Quentin Fottrell, Typical U.S. Worker Now Lasts 4.6 Years on the Job (Jan. 12, 2014 7:58 AM), 
http:// http://www.marketwatch.com/story/americans-less-likely-to-change-jobs-now-than-in-1980s-2014-
01-10 (arguing that Americans are no longer tied to a single employer for long periods of time).  
13 See Monique Morrissey, Private-sector Pension Coverage Fell by Half Over Two Decades, ECONOMIC 
POLICY INSTITUTE (Jan. 11, 2013, 9:27 AM), http://www.epi.org/blog/private-sector-pension-coverage-
decline/ (describing the decline of private-sector pension plans). 
14 A 401(k) plan is an employer-sponsored, defined-contribution plan that allows employees to save for 
retirement as a deduction from their paychecks before taxation.  Sometimes employees’ contributions are 
matched by the employer.  As of 2015, the maximum pre-tax contribution is $18,000.  403(b) plans are 
available for employees of certain tax exempt institutions such as public schools. 
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fiduciary burden to the employees.15  The fact that ERISA permitted DC plans to hold more 
of an employer’s stock than DB plans if desired by the employees made DC plans more 
attractive to management trying to ward off hostile takeovers.16  The creation of the modern 
Individual Retirement Account (IRA) by ERISA allowed beneficiaries to roll over the 
amounts in their DC plans to tax-deferred IRAs when they changed employers or retired.17  
Therefore, once DC plans became available, more assets shifted to these vehicles. 18   
Following ERISA, the total value of assets in private DC plans jumped from $104 billion 
in 1978 to $6.7 trillion in 2015, according to the Investment Company Institute.19 Evidence 
shows that Americans have increasingly accepted DC plans, which gave them more control 
over their retirement assets.20  While trade unions have favored DB plans (especially when 
managed by the unions), the erosion of unions’ power and membership as well as shift 
from manufacturing to the service sectors have also contributed to the decline of DB 
plans. 21  It is important to note that some Americans (federal and state government 
employees being the biggest group) are still DB plan participants.22  Nevertheless, over 
100,000 DB plans with over 7 million plan participants have terminated since the early 
                                                        
15 For DB plans, investment advisers are subject to the fiduciary standard meaning that any investment 
decisions must be in the “best interest” of the plan beneficiaries. 
16 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 460-62 (2004). 
17  An IRA account allows an individual to save for retirement on a tax-free or tax-deferred basis to 
supplement employer sponsored plans.  There are limits to how much individuals can save to take advantage 
of tax benefits.  
18 Id. at 474. 
19 See 2016 Investment Company Factbook, http://www.icifactbook.org/ch7/16_fb_ 
20 Friedberg, supra note 8, at 1. 
21 Daniel Beller and Helen Lawrence, Trends in Private Pension Plan Coverage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
1992.  
22 Zelinsky, supra note 10 at 460-62. 
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1980s. 23   Moreover, the shift from DB pension plans to DC plans appears to be 
accelerating.24  
The boom in assets in DC plans is closely linked to the explosion in IRA assets 
because a significant majority of the flows into IRAs is a result of rollovers from DC plans, 
rather than direct IRA contributions. 25 At the end of 2015, IRA assets totaled $7.3 
trillion.26 
b. Investors’ Financial Sophistication 
While DC plans provide investors control over their retirement portfolio in terms 
of its risk profile, timing of trades, etc., they also impose on investors the responsibility of 
managing the portfolio.  Therefore, a key question is whether investors have the education, 
skills and self-discipline to manage their own financial assets.  According to a recent White 
House report, many DC plan participants struggle to understand basic financial concepts 
such as costs, risks and reward, and diversification.27  According to the report, many 
individuals also do not understand the most fundamental concepts and terminology in 
investing.  The report additionally documents cognitive biases such as over-confidence, 
over-optimism, and loss aversion.  These deficiencies often lead to lower investment 
returns, because they lead households to: 1) trade too much by seeking active management 
                                                        
23Funding Challenge: Keeping Defined Benefit Plan Pension Plans Afloat: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. On Fin., 108th Cong. 57 (2003). 
24 See Dennis Triplett, The Great Shift: Moving From Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution, THE 
INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE CONSUMERISM, 
http://http://www.theihcc.com/en/communities/hsa_hra_fsa_admin_finance/the-great-shift-moving-from-
defined-benefit-to-def_hzohzk89.html. 
25 See, Jason Furman & Betsy Stevenson, The Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/23/effects-conflicted-
investment-advice-retirement-savings. 
26 See 2016 Investment Company Factbook, http://www.icifactbook.org/ch7/16_fb. 
27 Jason Furman & Betsy Stevenson, The Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings, THE 
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/23/effects-conflicted-investment-
advice-retirement-savings. 
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or chasing returns, 2) sell sound investments and hold risky, undiversified, 
underperforming assets based on recent performance, 3) overweight past returns, or 4) 
under-diversify.28  Jill Fisch and Tess Wilkinson-Ryan document that the majority of 
American investors do not understand the basic ideas like diversification, investment costs, 
inflation, and compound interest.29  They conclude that most Americans lack the requisite 
knowledge to protect them from outright financial fraud.30 Further evidence of investors’ 
lack of financial literacy comes from the study undertaken by the SEC at the directive of 
the U.S. Congress as part of the Dodd-Frank Act.  The study finds that investors had many 
fundamental financial misconceptions that were leading to important investment 
mistakes.31  The study also documents that most Americans are not even aware of how 
much they pay in fees and other costs.32 
c. Relative performance of DC and DB plans 
Given the lack of appropriate education, financial skills, and self-discipline to 
manage their financial assets, coupled with the inability to evaluate conflicted advice, one 
would expect DC plans to underperform DB plans.  DB plans spell out what benefit the 
enrollee will get upon retirement age, which is often calculated using a set formula and 
hence do not depend on the skill set of the beneficiary.  In contrast, the value of the DC 
plans at the time of retirement depends on how those assets are managed by the 
beneficiaries.   
                                                        
28 Id. at A1. 
29  See Jill E Fisch, and Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, “Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An 
Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice” (2014). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 415.  
30 Id. at 23. 
31 Id. at 608. 
32 Id. at 620. 
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Conceptually, traditional DB pension plans provide not only more professional 
management but also a better balance of risks and rewards.33  This is because the DB plans 
place almost all of the risk of performance on the shoulders of the employers.  If the DB 
assets outperform, the employer is able to reduce their contributions.  If the plan 
underperforms, the employer has to increase its contributions to the plan.  Because the 
employer has the ability to hire competent professional staff to assist with employee 
benefits planning, the system works reasonably well, achieving cost efficiencies, 
economies of scale, and diversification over generational cohorts.34  Nevertheless, it is 
conceptually possible that for financially-educated beneficiaries, DC plans can be used to 
control risk better. 35  Furthermore, some beneficiaries can custom tailor risk-reward 
tradeoff to their own particular needs.36  
Evidence shows that DB plans significantly outperform defined contribution plans.  
By design, DB plans handle inflation risk by computing benefits as a fraction of the 
beneficiaries’ salaries during the last few years of their working years.37  In contrast, in DC 
plans, the employees are expected make financial decisions that help protect against 
inflation risk.  In one study, DB plans outperformed DC plans by 76 basis points annually 
between 1995 and 2011.38 Another study found that DB plans outperformed DC plans 
                                                        
33 Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 Yale L.J. 451, 468 (2004). 
34 Id. at 8. 
35 Id. at 8. 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 ZVI BODIE ET AL, PENSIONS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 158 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1988), 
available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6047.pdf. 
38 See, e.g., Defined Benefit Plans Outperform Defined Contribution Plans Again, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON 
(July 2013), htpp:// https://www.towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/us-finance-
matters/2013/Defined-Benefit-Plans-Outperform-Defined-Contribution-Plans-Again. 
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during 1990-2012 by about 70 basis points annually.39  Given that there is over $6.7 trillion 
invested in DC plans accounts alone in 2015, underperformance of 70 basis points implies 
a cost of about $50 billion per year.  Once again, the lagging performance of the DC plans 
adds an additional burden on the American worker to increase their future contributions as 
well as to take higher levels of risk. 
d. Conflicts of interest in investment advice 
Because of their lack of financial education or even basic familiarity of investments, 
the American public needs professional investment advice.  For investors who seek 
professional advice, there are additional hurdles.  Since most investors cannot evaluate the 
appropriateness of the investment advice, they receive at times conflicted advice.  In its 
most basic form, conflicted advice promotes investment options that are profitable for the 
advisers and their firms but disadvantageous to the investor: these investments tend to 
underperform, impose higher transaction fees, and result in under-diversification.  Hence, 
it should come as no surprise that conflicted advice should result a negative effect on the 
performance of retirement assets.  
Estimates indicate that the aggregate annual cost of conflicted advice in IRA assets 
is about $17 billion each year. 40  Retirees who received conflicted advice when rolling 
over their 401(k) balance to an IRA retirement will lose approximately 12% of the value 
of his or her savings if drawn down over 30 years. The average IRA rollover for those aged 
55 to 64 in 2012 was $100,000, hence losing 12% to fees is the equivalent to losing 
                                                        
39 See Alicia H. Munnell, Investment Returns: Defined Benefit vs. Defined Contribution Plans, BOSTON 
COLLEGE CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH (Dec. 2015), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/IB_15-211.pdf (finding that defined benefit plans did better by .7 percent). 
40 See, e.g., Jason Furman & Betsy Stevenson, The Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement 
Savings, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/23/effects-
conflicted-investment-advice-retirement-savings. 
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$12,000.  This is a significant sum, exceeding the total savings of a typical American family 
for many years.  This evidence corroborates the initiative by DOL that reducing conflicted 
advice will improve the retirement of savings of typical Americans. 
2. Investment Advisory Standards 
a. Evolution of the Current Standard 
DOL has the authority to set rules and standards under both ERISA and the Internal 
Revenue Code governing fiduciaries of retirement plans and IRAs. Prior to the current 
standard the rule in effect was the 1975 DOL rule. Separately, SEC rules govern the 
conduct of registered investment advisers and broker-dealers who advise retail investors, 
under the provisions of federal securities laws (Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).41  The current system, established in the 1940s, left 
it to states to develop separate definitions of what the fiduciary standard should be, which 
often lead to confusion. 42 
In response to the increased significance of the conflict of interest issue due to the 
change in the retirement savings environment from DB to DC plans, various government 
agencies have been floating the idea of a new fiduciary standard for years. The Dodd-Frank 
Act directed the SEC to consider a uniform standard for investment advisers and broker-
dealers, in part to standardize the care that investors get across jurisdictions.43  As of the 
                                                        
41 Regulating Advice Markets, Department of Labor Report, April 2016. 42 Fiduciary Standard Resource Center, SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.sifma.org/issues/private-client/fiduciary-standard/overview/ (last visited May 3, 2016). 43 Fiduciary Standard Resource Center, SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.sifma.org/issues/private-client/fiduciary-standard/overview/ (last visited May 3, 2016). 
 17 
writing of this paper the SEC has not released any proposals regarding a uniform fiduciary 
standard.  
In Oct 2010, DOL proposed amendments to the 1975 regulation.  The proposed 
fiduciary standard included both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.  These duties require 
the fiduciary to act in the best interest of the consumer and to provide full and fair 
disclosure of material facts and conflicts of interest.  The proposals prompted an intense 
debate with opponents claiming that the conflicts of interest were not material and that it 
would have an adverse impact on small IRA accounts. In response, DOL announced in 
September 2011 its intention to develop a more robust proposal with extensive analysis of 
the economic impact. 44 
In April 2015, DOL announced its withdrawal of the 2010 proposal and issued a 
new proposal.  After an extensive comment period, the Office of Management and Budget 
received DOL’s final rule on January 28, 2016.45  By broadening the definition of fiduciary 
investment advice, the new rules subject brokers, among others, to the fiduciary standard, 
thereby requiring them to put client interests ahead of their own when offering investment 
advice for retirement plans.  The rule includes changes to the definition of fiduciary 
investment advice for purposes of the ERISA standards of fiduciary conduct and the 
prohibited transaction rules of section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code. The new rules 
include the “Best Interest Contract exemption” (BICE), which the DOL indicated was 
intended to preserve common compensation practices while requiring those who provide 
fiduciary investment advice to adhere to the “best interest” standard of care. BICE requires 
                                                        44 Regulating Advice Markets, Department of Labor Report, April 2016. 
45 Daniel R. Kleinman et al., Department of Labor Sends Fiduciary Rule to OMB for Review, THE NATIONAL 
LAW REVIEW (2016). 
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that investment advisers: 1) provide advice in the client’s best interest; 2) create policies 
that deal with any potential conflict of interest; 3) clearly disclose any conflict of interest  
(an example of this would be hidden fees); and 4) enter into a written agreement 
contractually committed to these requirements.  
While the “final” proposal itself went through multiple iterations, there are two 
critical changes in the final rule that are important for our purposes.46 
• Advisers can receive compensation such as brokerage or insurance commissions, 
12b-1 fees, revenue-sharing payments. 
• Advisers can include proprietary products. 
Unfortunately for the retirement beneficiaries, these two exemptions that DOL 
provided in response to last minute industry pressure in fact recreate the problems of 
multiple-principals and opacity, respectively, and consequently can completely undermine 
the entire intent of the new rule. 
b. Commentary on the Pros and Cons of the New Standard  
Some commentators have argued that there is a moral case for the new fiduciary 
standard.  People who are investing other people’s money should be providing advice and 
guidance that are in the best interest of the clients who might not have the necessary 
expertise to evaluate the services. The fiduciary standard is in line with this moral view 
because it requires financial professionals to make decisions based on the question: “Is this 
really in the client’s best interests?”  Clearly, the suitability standard falls short of this 
                                                        46 Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, http:// https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fs-conflict-of-interest.html 
(last visited May 4, 2016). 
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requirement because it 1) creates conflicts of interest and 2) leads to more expensive and 
less appropriate services.47 
Others have pointed to the potential adverse impacts of the new rule. 48  One 
potential negative may be that the fiduciary rule will be costly for financial firms to 
implement. Stephen Ellis has stated:  
“We think that the investors and analysts looking at the more studied 
implementation costs of the rule are vastly underestimating the rule’s potential 
impact on the financial sector. Current government and financial industry reports 
have a high-end annual cost of $1.1 billion, but even our low-end prohibited 
transaction revenue estimate is $2.4 billion.”49 
Clearly, higher costs of implementation of the new rule for financial firms are an 
undesirable burden on the entire economy. 
Some commentators have argued that the new rule may also lead to political fallout 
for the Government and a decline in trust of government agencies by increasing costs and 
reducing investors’ choices.  In the last few weeks, House Speaker Paul Ryan has become 
the most vocal opponent of the new fiduciary rule.50  Mr. Ryan has called the new rule 
“Obamacare for financial planning.”  His main contention is that the new rule will lead to 
higher costs for the beneficiaries as well as financial firms.  The House has introduced two 
bills that were designed to reduce by half the implementation costs of the new rule, but it 
is unclear whether these bills will marshal the necessary support.  In a public statement, 
                                                        
47 See Barry Ritholtz, Find a Financial Adviser who Will Put Your Interests First, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 
25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/get-there/find-a-financial-adviser-who-will-put-your-
interests-first/2014/10/23/21f3a898-596f-11e4-bd61-346aee66ba29_story.html. 
48  Bloomberg, Inside the Pros and Cons of a New Fiduciary Rule, YOUTUBE (Apr. 7, 2016), http:// 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2016-04-07/inside-the-pros-and-cons-of-a-new-fiduciary-rule. 
49 DOL to Continue Fiduciary Fight in 2016, BANKRATE, (Jan. 12, 2016, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.bankrate.com/financing/investing/dol-to-continue-fiduciary-fight-in-2016/. 
50 Mark Schoeff, House Speaker Paul Ryan Becomes Leading Opponent of DOL Fiduciary Rule, 
INVESTMENT NEWS (Mar. 8, 2016, 1:46 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160308/FREE/160309931/house-speaker-paul-ryan-becomes-
leading-opponent-of-dol-fiduciary. 
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Mr. Ryan has argued: “When this rule comes down, we will be ready to do what we can to 
protect the savings of hardworking Americans.”51   
Mr. Ryan’s concerns are also shared by the financial services industry.  Some are 
concerned that the new rule could increase litigation costs for financial firms.52  Some 
argue that the rule will encourage clients to sue and the threat of litigation may lead advisers 
to leave the business.53  Some experts predict that financial services firms will move more 
assets to fee-based performance which could limit choice for investors.54   
As a result of the opposition from the financial services industry, the final rule has 
been watered down significantly. 55   The final rule did not include some previously 
proposed regulatory requirements, including annual investment projections and disclosures 
and 401(k) plan contract requirements.  The rule also contains exceptions that allow 
financial firms and advisers to market themselves to consumers.  For example, advisers can 
engage in marketing and public relations without violating the new rule.  Public comments, 
press release, and marketing materials are exempt.56  The Obama administration spent a lot 
of time discussing the urgent need for the new rule, yet some of the provisions have been 
delayed until 2017 or 2018.  The delay in implementation means that a subsequent 
administration could further modify or nullify the new rule through the political process. 
                                                        
51 Id. at 1. 52  Several lawsuits have been filed on behalf of fiduciaries against the new rules. See 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160930/FREE/160939992/thrivent-financial-files-sixth-lawsuit-
against-dol-fiduciary-rule. 
53 Andrew Welsch, Will Fiduciary Rules Spur New Lawsuits Against Advisers? ONWALLSTREET (Apr. 19, 
2016, 6:22 PM), http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/will-fiduciary-rule-spur-new-lawsuits-against-
advisers-IAG2696400.  
54 Id. at A1.  A fixed fee such as $50 per year management fee or consultation fee may be too heavy burden 
for many small investors. 
55 Ashlea Ebeling, DOL Issues Final Fiduciary Rule: Does it Fall Short? FORBES (Apr. 7, 2016, 4:28 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2016/04/07/dol-issues-final-fiduciary-rule-does-it-fall-
short/#3664cd75548e. 
56 Id. at A1. 
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In this paper, we argue that the two most important deficiencies of the new rule, 
allowed by DOL in response to industry pressure, are the exemptions for multiple sources 
of income for the advisers and alternative and proprietary investments.  These two 
provisions together can undermine the foundation of the fiduciary rule, namely enabling 
the retirement beneficiaries to receive the best investment advice. Consequently, without 
transparency and single-principal requirements, we do not expect investors to be the main 
beneficiaries of the new fiduciary rules, because investors will continue to get conflicted 
advice.57  
c. Multiple-principals problem 
The first major problem with the new DOL rule is BICE which allows investment 
advisers to receive income from both investors as well as financial institutions such as 
brokerage firms whose products the adviser may recommend. 58  This exemption has 
created potential conflicts of interest when an agent (investment adviser) attempts to serve 
multiple principals (investors and financial institutions) whose interests diverge. Benefiting 
one principal more necessarily means hurting the other.  In effect the potential conflict of 
                                                        
57 See What it Means for Investors: Rules for Financial Advisers are Changing, USA TODAY (Apr. 6, 2016 
11:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2016/04/05/fiduciary-ruling-investor-
adviser-adviser/82655312/. 
58 “The provisions at issue generally prohibit fiduciaries with respect to employee benefit plans and 
individual retirement accounts (IRAs) from engaging in self-dealing and receiving compensation from third 
parties in connection with transactions involving the plans and IRAs. The exemption allows entities such as 
registered investment advisers, broker-dealers and insurance companies, and their agents and 
representatives, that are ERISA or Code fiduciaries by reason of the provision of investment advice, to 
receive compensation that may otherwise give rise to prohibited transactions as a result of their advice to 
plan participants and beneficiaries, IRA owners and certain plan fiduciaries (including small plan 
sponsors). The exemption is subject to protective conditions to safeguard the interests of the plans, 
participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners. The exemption affects participants and beneficiaries of 
plans, IRA owners and fiduciaries with respect to such plans and IRAs.”  See, Best Interest Contract 
Exemption, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/HtmlDisplay.aspx?DocId=28807&AgencyId=8&DocumentType=2
. 
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interest caused by this exemption can possibly undermine the entire basis of the fiduciary 
rule and sets the stage to continued potential conflicts of interest.  The conflict of interest 
caused by this exemption is exacerbated by the exemption for alternative and proprietary 
investments as explained below.  
d. Problems with Alternative and Proprietary Investments 
Alternative and proprietary investment products refer to specialized investments 
portfolios created by the brokerage firms.  These products can include combinations of 
stocks, bonds, and derivative assets.  They can also include investments in start-ups and 
other private investment vehicles or claims on other non-publicly traded assets such as 
forests, mines, or works of art.  The key feature of alternative and proprietary investments 
is that they are unique to the financial institution offering them.  Consequently, there is 
little or no historical performance or risk data and the information about them is limited to 
what the sponsor provides.  Valuations are often private.  In addition, fees and expenses 
can be built into the product parameters and are typically much higher than that of mutual 
funds and other publicly listed securities.  Given the lack of historical data, public trading 
records, or easy way of valuing these assets, brokerage firms typically advertise 
hypothetical returns for these products rather than actual historical performance.59  Because 
of the lack of full information and hidden fees, it is very likely that these products are 
highly profitable to the financial institutions offering them. Since these financial products 
are a zero-sum game, brokers’ profits will come at the expense of retirement investors.  
Given the exemption about receiving compensation from third-parties, the sponsoring 
                                                        59  See, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/ex-brokers-say-jpmorgan-favored-selling-banks-own-
funds-over-others/?ref=susannecraig 
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brokers and financial institutions can share some of these excess profits with investment 
advisers.  As a result, investment advisers are more likely to recommend alternative and 
proprietary investments over publicly available mutual funds to investors, to the investors’ 
detriment.  
Structured products are a common type of proprietary products.  Structured 
products provide investors with modified income streams using options, leverage, and 
other derivatives.  For instance, a structured product can increase in value when the overall 
market goes down, volatility or interest rates increase, or oil prices decline.   By their very 
nature, structured products constitute a black-box.  One can observe the investment returns 
they generate without allowing investors a full and complete picture of how they work, 
what the costs and fees are, and what the future returns may be.60  As a result, structured 
products can be characterized as offering poor transparency.   
An extreme example of an inappropriate proprietary product is a dominated asset.  
A dominated asset is one that offers lower returns for the same level of risk or higher risk 
for the same level of return as another asset (typically publicly traded funds).  Therefore, 
investing in a dominated asset is not in the best interest of any rational investor who prefers 
higher returns and lower risk. The most common reason a particular proprietary product 
would be dominated is the high expenses which is simply income for the financial 
institution that created the proprietary product.   
Evidence shows that on average, dominated proprietary products had returns over 
sixty basis points worse than other similar risk funds.61  Furthermore, dominated assets are 
                                                        
60 Katrina Lamb, An Introduction to Structured Products, INVESTOPEDIA (2016), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/optioninvestor/07/structured_products.asp. 
61 Id. at 1346. 
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recommended even though they are not in the best interest of the retirement beneficiaries. 
Given the lack of transparency about the proprietary investment products, investors are 
unable to judge what product is being recommended, what the risks and expected returns 
are, sometimes even what the fees are, and whether the product is dominated. 
Dominated assets can exist in employer sponsored DC plans also.  Employers may 
insert high-fee assets into retirement plan menus presumably to increase employees’ 
choices.  In return, employers may receive direct and indirect benefits from financial 
institutions sponsoring these products.  In extreme cases, some of these high-cost products 
can become dominated assets.  Over half of plans have menus with at least one dominated 
fund.  For such plans, dominated funds have over 10% of plan assets.  While it is up to the 
employees to choose what they believe is the best product for them, their choice is 
influenced by the options presented to them in the retirement plan.  Financial advisers 
clearly have the incentive to advise clients to invest more in dominated assets in return for 
payments from the sponsoring institutions. As discussed earlier, investors’ relative lack of 
financial sophistication combined with the opacity of proprietary products makes it 
difficult for them to critically evaluate the advice they receive from their financial advisers.  
Unfortunately, regulations tend to be weaker when the issue is the cost of the 
investment products.  ERISA was focused mainly on diversification, and the regulators 
have sidestepped their obligation to make sure that fund costs are appropriate.  In the case 
of Hecker vs. Deer & Co., the 7th circuit held it “untenable to suggest that all of the more 
than 2500 publicly available investment options had excessive expense ratios.”62  Thus, 
                                                        
62 Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 577-592 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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courts have granted legal immunity to providers that offer investors the choice of 
dominated funds that are bad for investors.  
Under a fiduciary standard, investment advisers could be tasked with ensuring the 
plans do not contain dominated funds.  Revenue sharing is an additional issue. Plan 
fiduciaries may move assets to higher-cost funds because of benefits they receive from the 
product sponsors. Unfortunately, DOL guidelines do not explicitly deal with dominated 
assets, if the availability of these funds can be argued to be in a client’s “best interest.”63 
3. Evidence of Conflicts of Interest 
a. Fiduciary Standard and Performance of Corporate Pension Funds 
We can gain insights into the likely effects of the conflict of interest built into the 
new fiduciary standard on the performance of DC retirement accounts by examining the 
performance of DB corporate pension funds which are already subject to the fiduciary 
standard yet attempt to serve two principals.  Conflicts of interest arise in the case of DB 
pension funds whenever corporate executives serve as pension fund fiduciaries (fiduciary-
executives). These fiduciary-executives are subject to potential conflicts of interest since 
they also attempt to serve two principals: their shareholders and their beneficiaries.  Such 
conflicts of interest might affect the performance of DB pension funds. 
The performance of DB corporate pension funds has also been of great concern to 
fund beneficiaries, corporate management, and regulatory agencies. These concerns have 
been triggered by the record aggregate deficit of private pension plans, greater than $330 
billion in 2004 compared to less than $100 billion in 1995.  Moreover, the number of                                                         
63 Ian Ayres, The Problem of 401(k) Mapping to Dominated Funds, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2014, 10:48 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/whynot/2014/03/29/the-problem-of-401k-mapping-to-dominated-
funds/#5a3595cc7702. 
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pension plans that are under the trusteeship of the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation 
has also dramatically increased resulting in a seven-fold increase in the benefits paid out 
by PBGC between 1995 and 2015.64  
While part of this problem can be traced to the dismal stock market performance 
during the latter part of this period, it has brought to the forefront the concern that corporate 
managers may also be responsible for the deficits of their companies’ pension funds. The 
popular press has been rife with accusations of corporate theft of pension funds65  Some of 
the wealth transfer tactics that corporations are accused of are: a) projecting an 
unrealistically high return, claiming the pension plan is overfunded, and reducing 
contributions to the plan and diverting them to other uses; b) converting from conventional 
plans to cash balance plans which reduces payouts but does not trigger a tax for 
termination;66 c) declaring bankruptcy which typically entails losses to employee pension 
plans while setting up pension plans for senior management that are protected (example 
Enron & American Airlines); and d) siphoning pension plan surpluses to pay termination 
benefits and retirees' medical benefits.67 
We can assess the likely effects of the conflicts of interest of fiduciary-executives 
of DB pension funds by examining the performance of the fund trading decisions involving 
their own companies’ stock since such decisions often involve trading off the interests of 
                                                        
64 The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Annual report states that it paid $5.6 billion in benefits in 2015 
compared to $761 million in 1995.  See, http://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2015-annual-report.pdf. 
65 See, e.g., Robert Kuttner, The Great American Pension Fund Robbery, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2003 12:00 
AM), http:// http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2003-09-07/the-great-american-pension-fund-
robbery. 
66 This tactic was pioneered by Bank of America in 1985. Nevertheless, on July 31, 2003, in response to a 
lawsuit by IBM workers, a federal judge ruled that such conversions are illegal.  
67 Lucent Technologies, Inc., Dupont Co. and SBC Communications, Inc. are some of the companies that 
used this tactic. See Ellen Schultz, Coming up Short: Firms had a Hand in Pension Flight They Now Bemoan, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 10, 2003) at A1.  
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shareholders against that of pension beneficiaries. Consider for instance, the private, 
confidential corporate information fiduciary-executives possess routinely as part of their 
managerial engagement with the firm.  If they ignore this confidential information, or use 
it to trade shares in pension funds to benefit their shareholders (to temporarily influence 
the stock price to obtain a favorable price in an acquisition, for example), then they fail in 
their fiduciary responsibility to the pension beneficiaries. If they use this information to 
benefit their pensioners, then they violate insider trading laws, which is illegal and, in 
addition, fail in their fiduciary responsibility to their own shareholders. 68 This is the 
conundrum facing fiduciary-executives when they serve two principals.   
To provide a concrete example assume that the executive-fiduciaries possess some 
positive non-public information regarding a possible takeover of their own firm.  Based on 
this positive, non-public information, should the fiduciary-executives buy shares from the 
market place for the pension fund, do nothing or sell shares from the pension fund to their 
favored third parties?  If they buy shares in the marketplace, they would be acting in the 
best interest of the pension beneficiaries but clearly against the best interest of their 
shareholders.  If they do nothing, they are not actively helping either of their principals.  If 
they sell shares out of the pension assets, they are clearly acting against the best interest of 
the pension beneficiaries.   
Evidence indicates that the potential conflicts are real and not just of academic 
interest.  As evidence of conflicts of interest involved in the trading of company stock in 
DB funds, pension plan beneficiaries have filed several lawsuits accusing fiduciary-
                                                        68 Interestingly, the recent fair disclosure regulation (Regulation FD) has exacerbated this conflict of interest. 
While ERISA requires fiduciary-managers to act in the best interests of pension fund beneficiaries, 
Regulation FD forbids them from favoring one investor over another. 
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executives of breaching their fiduciary duty by not selling the company stock held by their 
pension plans in time before the stock prices dropped.69  Critics have pointed to evidence 
of suboptimal diversification: more than 27% of all employees hold at least half of their 
401(k) balances in company stock and nearly 7% have their entire account in company 
stock, as evidence of suboptimal diversification. In response to the concern that fiduciary-
executives may not always act in the interest of fund beneficiaries, some corporations have 
hired independent fiduciaries to handle the trading of company stock in their own employee 
pension funds.70 
In order to provide formal evidence of conflict of interest of fiduciary-executives 
of DB pension funds, we analyze the performance of pension fund trades in which the fund 
attains insider status. A pension fund attains insider status either by acquiring more than 
10% of the outstanding shares in a given firm (typically this is the sponsoring firm’s 
shares), or by appointing a top level executive (an insider) as the fiduciary. In these 
instances, the pension fund acquires a legal-insider status and must report all subsequent 
transactions to the SEC.71  
It is well-documented that insiders as a group earn abnormal positive returns from 
trading in their own companies' stocks, presumably taking advantage of their privileged 
access to information.72 Top executives typically earn a higher rate of return than officers 
                                                        
69 See Jeff Opdyke, Retirement Plans Get New Safeguards, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 21, 2005, 
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB111930752257264546. Some of the companies against whom 
lawsuits have been filed in 2005 are American Insurance Group, Delphi, General Motors, Krispy Kreme 
Doughnuts, and Merck. 70 Jeff Opdyke, Retirement Plans Get New Safeguards, WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 21, 2005, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB111930752257264546.  71 Legal-insider status ends if the fiduciary is a lower-level executive or a non-executive and/or the pension 
fund reduces its equity investment to 10% or under. 
72 See Nejat Seyhun, Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading (MIT Press 1998). 
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and directors, who in turn earn a higher rate of return than large outside shareholders.73  
Another strand of literature ties the profitability of insider trading to corporate governance 
and internal control mechanisms.74  In the case of insider-pension funds, however, the 
presence of conflicts of interest can result in positive or negative abnormal returns. If the 
concerns of the proponents of fiduciary independence are valid, insider trades by pension 
funds will favor shareholders and executives at the expense of the beneficiaries, resulting 
in negative abnormal returns.  
b. Data and performance measures 
The insider trading data in the study is obtained from a compilation by Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and made available for sale. The data contains all open 
market insider trading in publicly traded firms between January 1975 and December 
2014.75 For the purposes of this study, only open market purchases and sales are included. 
                                                        
73 See, e.g., H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON.  
189, 210 (1986); Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work? 23 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-19, 
2010); H. Nejat Seyhun, The Information Content of Aggregate Insider Trading, 61 J. BUS. 1-22 (1988); H. 
Nejat Seyhun, Why Does Aggregate Insider Trading Predict Future Stock Returns? Quarterly J. Econ. 1302, 
1329(1992); Bin Ke et al., What Insiders Know About Future Earnings and How They Use It: Evidence from 
Insiders’ Trade, 35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 315 (2003); John E. Core et al., Stock Market Anomalies: What 
Can We Learn from Repurchases and Insider Trading? 25 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=533323, 2005); Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions 
and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315, 1315 (1985); H. Nejat Seyhun & Michael Bradley, Corporate 
Bankruptcy and Insider Trading, 70 J. BUS. 189, 203, 214 (1997). 
74 Taylan Mavruk & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do SEC’s 10b5-1 Safe Harbor Rules need to be rewritten, 2016 Colum. 
Bus. L. Rev. 153 (2016); Cindy A. Schipani and H. Nejat Seyhun, Defining "Material, Nonpublic": What 
Should Constitute Illegal Insider Information?, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 327 (2016); S. Burcu Avci, 
Cindy A. Schipani and H. Nejat Seyhun, Ending Executive manipulations of incentive compensation, J. 
CORP. L. 2016; S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani and H. Nejat Seyhun, Manipulative games of gifts by 
corporate executives, U. PENN. J. BUS. L., 18, 2016, Hollis A.Skaife et al., Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from the Profitability of Insider Trading, 55 J. Acct. 
& Econ. 91, 107 (2013); Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 
68 J L. & ECON. 371, 403 (2005); Scott L. Summers & John T. Sweeney, Fraudulently Misstated Financial 
Statements and Insider Trading: An Empirical Analysis, 73 Acct. Rev. 131, 144 (1998); Enrichetta Ravina 
& Paola Sapienza,  What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 
962, 1001 (2010). 
75 For most of the sample period analyzed here, Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act requires 
that insider transactions be disclosed within the first 10 days of the month following the month of the trade. 
Section 16(b) prohibits insiders from profiting from short-term price movements defined as profitable 
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Private transactions, shares acquired through exercise of options, and trades with 
corporations are excluded. The data on stock market returns are obtained from CRSP. The 
final sample contains all insider trades between January 1975 and December 2014 in firms 
for which stock return data is available in CRSP. 
From this sample we extract trades by insiders identified as pension funds. To be 
included in this sample, an insider’s name (name of trader) in the database must contain 
the word “pension.”  As mentioned earlier, for a pension fund to be classified as an insider 
to a company, either it must hold more than 10% of any equity class of security of the firm, 
or the fiduciary of the pension fund must be a top-level executive. An insider relation code 
indicates whether the insider status for the pension fund arises as a result of the large 
shareholdings or interlocking executives. 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of insider trades by pension funds. Panel A 
provides the statistics by insider type: whether the trade was classified as an insider trade 
because of 10% equity ownership (Shareholder) or fiduciary-executive (Officer).  The 
sample contains 1,661 purchases transactions and 1,339 sale transactions. The number of 
shares purchased is about 132 million, while the average purchase size is about 79,000 
shares.  The total number of shares sold is about 103 million, while the average sale size is 
about 90,000 shares.  The bulk of the trades are by Shareholders (about 121 million shares 
purchased and 89 million shares sold) while the trades by the Officers are relatively smaller 
(about 11 million shares purchased and 13 million shares sold).                                                         
offsetting pairs of transactions within 6 months of each other, while Section 16(c) prohibits profiting from 
short-sales. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (effective August 29, 2002) has modified insider trading regulations 
in many significant ways. First, the new reporting requirement states that insider transactions must be 
reported electronically by the end of the second business day following the day on which the transaction is 
executed both through EDGAR and corporate public websites. Sarbanes-Oxley also prohibits purchase and 
sale of securities during black-out periods. Any profit made from these prohibited transactions shall inure to 
and are recoverable by the corporation. 
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Panel B of Table 1 classifies pension fund insider transactions based on whether 
the fund assets are managed in separate accounts or commingled with pension assets of 
other firms.76  A separate account is a pension fund held for employees of a single firm. A 
commingled fund, on the other hand, holds the pension investments of two or more firms’ 
employees.  We use two criteria to identify separate accounts and commingled funds. First, 
if a pension fund traded in shares of more than one firm with insider status we identified 
this fund as a commingled fund.  Second, if the pension fund’s name contained only the 
name of a fund management firm and did not include the name of the client firm whose 
pension money is being managed (e.g. Morgan Guarantee Trust Pension Fund) we 
classified the fund as a commingled fund. 77  Panel B indicates that separate account 
transactions involve 2,220 transactions 69 firms with about 98 million shares traded 
compared with 780 transactions in 89 firms and 136 million shares traded for the 
commingled accounts.   
For all our reported results, we measure market-adjusted abnormal profits 
computed in the following manner: 
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where ,i tr  is the with- dividend return to stock i on day t and ,m tr  is the with-dividend return 
to an equally weighted portfolio of all New York Stock Exchange, American Stock 
Exchange, and NASDAQ stocks on day t.78  The parameter H is equal to 1 if the insider 
trade is a purchase and −1 if it is a sale.  Therefore, a negative reported market-adjusted 
                                                        76 As described later, these two types of funds differ in the extent of conflicts of interest. 
77 To the extent our classification is not perfect, we would tend to blur the distinction between separate and 
commingled categories and we would bias our results toward the inability to distinguish between these two. 
78 We measured abnormal return using the cumulative abnormal return measure and obtain similar results. 
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abnormal profit implies that the return following a purchase is negative or the return 
following a sale is positive.  The market-adjusted abnormal returns are computed over the 
horizon of T trading days, starting from the day following the insider trade date. We report 
results for four different horizons, measured in calendar days: 6 months, 12 months, 18 
months, and 24 months. 
c. Performance of DB funds when trading as insiders 
In this section we report the performance of the trades of DB pension funds as 
insiders and then compare it to the performance of all insiders.  Given the potential conflict 
of interest in pension funds arising from attempting to serve two principals (shareholders 
and fund beneficiaries), we would expect the returns of pension fund trades to be lower. 
Table 2 reports the market adjusted returns of pension funds insider trades. The 
MAR is reported for all pension fund insider trades as well as for the two classes of insider 
relationship of the funds (Shareholders and Officers).  In the full sample we see returns 
statistically insignificant from zero for three of the four horizons with a significantly (at 
the 1% significance level) negative return of −10.54% in the 24-month sample.  When we 
split the sample into the two classes of insider relationship, we see that the results are driven 
by the subsample where the insider relationship arises because of the shareholding in 
excess of 10% (i.e., Shareholders).  In this subsample the returns are negative and 
significant at the 1% level for all but the shortest horizon, with the returns ranging from 
−5.57% to −15.03%.   
The implications of the results become more noteworthy when we compare the 
returns reported in Table 2 with that of all insiders (not just pension funds).  These results 
are reported in Table 4 (first row).  It can be seen that insiders as group earn significantly 
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positive mean MAR over all horizons with returns ranging from 2.40% for the 6-month 
horizon to 6.35% for the 24-month horizon.  When we compare these returns that of 
pension fund trades of either the Shareholder subsample (negative for most horizons) or 
the Officer subsample (not different from zero for all horizons), it can be seen that the 
returns of both these subsamples are significantly lower; the Shareholder subsample 
performs worse.  These results are consistent with the presence of conflicts of interest in 
DB pension funds.  More importantly the impact of the conflict of interest is significant. 
For example, over a 12-month horizon the return of pension trades in the Shareholder 
subsample is lower than that of all insiders by 9.47%! 
As Table 2 shows, the returns are significantly negative when the pension fund 
acquires a large equity stake in the sponsoring firm. It is possible to argue that holding a 
large equity stake in the shares of the sponsoring firm could never be optimal for the 
pensioners in the first place.  Given that their human capital is already tied up in the fortunes 
of the sponsor, the optimal holding in their own company stock should be very small or 
nil.  Consequently, acquiring these large equity stakes serves as a clear signal of the 
potential conflicts of interest, which is confirmed by the evidence.  
The conclusion from the above results is that pension funds earn negative market-
adjusted returns when they acquire a large equity stake in the underlying firms.  Thus it is 
clear that the poor performance of pension fund trades when they trade as insiders is an 
exception to the performance of overall insider trades.  This result is consistent with the 
finding of noted academics that defined-benefit pension funds that invest in equity 
underperform the S&P 500 index.79                                                         79 Josef Lakonishok, The Structure and Performance of the Money Management Industry, BROOKINGS 
PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 339, 339-91 (1992). 
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d. Comparison of separate accounts and commingled funds 
While the poor performance of insider trades of pension funds as whole provides 
preliminary support for the proponents of independent pension fund fiduciaries, the case 
for independent fiduciaries will be stronger if we find that the degree of independence is 
positively related to fund performance. We propose the following methodology to test this 
relationship. As noted earlier, pension funds can be categorized as separate accounts or 
commingled funds with the former created exclusively for a sponsoring company's 
employees, while the latter mingle the pension investments of multiple companies.  If one 
is concerned about conflicts of interest of the fiduciary-executive, an argument can be made 
that the conflicts of interest are worse in the case of separate accounts.  In separate accounts 
insiders can use pension fund assets either to benefit themselves or their shareholders 
directly without having to co-ordinate their decisions with anyone else.  They can do so by 
using the pension funds’ assets to prop up their stock prices temporarily (by directing the 
pension fund to buy the shares of their firm prior to exercise of their executive stock options 
or prior to an acquisition), or push their stock prices down temporarily (by directing the 
pension fund to sell shares of their firm prior to granting of executive stock options).  These 
actions would hurt the beneficiaries of pension funds and benefit the insiders themselves 
or the firm’s stockholders.  In contrast, such actions require co-ordination and collusion 
with the outside managers of commingled funds.  Such coordination and collusion is likely 
to be difficult to achieve and costly for several reasons.  First, the interests of the 
commingled pension fund manager and the firm’s executives and/or shareholders may not 
be congruent.  For instance, the timing of key events relating to the compensation contracts 
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of firm’s executives (granting and exercise of executive stock options) and that of pension 
fund managers (evaluation dates of pension fund performance) need not be the same.  
Second, for commingled fund managers, the performance of one of the stocks in their 
portfolio is less critical than for the firm’s executives and shareholders.  Third, benefiting 
the insiders might require quid-pro-quos, payment of which is likely to increase the 
probability of detection.  And finally, outside professional pension fund managers have 
more to lose in terms of their reputation by engaging in these types of manipulations in a 
given pension fund.  Consequently, we expect conflicts of interest to be less prevalent in 
outside managed commingled funds.  Therefore, if conflicts of interest are present, we 
expect insider trades of commingled funds to outperform that of separate accounts.  
Since the results from Table 2 show that the conflict of interest issue is significant 
in the Shareholder subsample, we investigate whether in this subsample the returns of 
comingled funds are greater than that of separate accounts.  Table 3 presents the results. 
There are about 817 and 704 trades by separate accounts and commingled funs, 
respectively.  The mean MAR of separate accounts is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level for all but the shortest horizon, with the returns ranging from −7.98% to 
−19.69%. The mean MAR of commingles funds on the other hand are not significantly 
different from zero for all but the longest horizon.  For the 24-month horizon the mean 
MAR for commingled funds is −9.08% and significant; however, it is lower than the mean 
MAR of the separate accounts for the same horizon (and the difference is significantly 
different from zero).  Thus, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a 
conflict of interest between fund managers and fund beneficiaries with the fund managers 
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acting in the interest of the firm’s shareholders or themselves at the expense of the fund 
beneficiaries. 
e. Investigation of alternative explanations for the results 
In this section we investigate three alternative explanations for the poor 
performance of insider trades of pension funds relative to insider trades as a whole.  
Specifically, we investigate if the performance is the result of some unknown bias in the 
subsample of firms in our data with pension fund insider trades; if it is due to liquidity 
constraints resulting from unexpected outflows; and finally, if it is due to the difference in 
trading strategies of pension funds.  The tests that follow rule out all three alternative 
explanations for the poor relative performance of pension fund insider trades. 
1. Sample bias 
To test if the subsample of firms with pension fund insider trades has any special 
characteristics that result in the poor performance of these trades, we analyze the trading 
performance of other insiders in the same sub sample of firms with pension fund insider 
trades.  These tests help us check the possibility that there is something unique about these 
particular set of firms that leads to trading losses.  Perhaps, all other insiders (in addition 
to pension funds) suffer trading losses in these set of firms due to some unspecified chain 
of events.  
It can be seen from the second row of Table 4 that the mean MAR for all other 
insiders is positive and significant at the 1% level for all horizons.  Hence, while pension 
funds suffer trading losses, the other insiders in the same set of firms are trading profitably.  
These results contrast sharply with the performance of pension fund insider trades reported 
in Table 2.  In summary, we find that pension funds do systematically worse than other 
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insiders in the same firms, thus providing no evidence of any bias in the sample of firms 
with pension fund insider trades. 
2. Liquidity constraints 
It is possible that the relatively poor performance of pension fund insider trades is 
due to forced liquidation of assets to meet pension payments to beneficiaries.  Open-end 
mutual funds and ESOPs face similar liquidity constraints.  One can reasonably argue that 
mutual funds face greater risk of liquidity constraints than pension funds since flows in and 
out of mutual funds are less predictable than the flows in and out of pension funds.  To test 
this hypothesis, we compared the performance of pension fund insider trades with that of 
mutual fund and ESOP insider trades.80  
To identify mutual fund trades we searched the names of traders in the insider 
trading database for words that identify them as a mutual fund.  Our algorithm searched for 
the following specific words: ‘Fund’, ‘Principal’, ‘Venture Capital’ ‘Euroventure’, ‘Capital 
Corporation’, ‘Partner’, ‘Trust’, ‘Investment’, and ‘Asset Management’.  We also ensured 
that the name of the insider did not contain the word ‘Pension’.  ESOP firms were identified 
by searching for key words ‘employee stock ownership’ and ‘ESOP’.  
The performance of mutual fund insider trades is reported in the third row of Table 
4.  The mean MAR is positive and significant at the 1% level for all horizons.  In addition, 
the monotonic relation between the mean MAR and the horizon indicates that mutual fund 
insider trades yield positive returns in each of the periods. 
                                                        
80 Similar to pension funds, fiduciaries of ESOPs also face conflicts of interest situations. They might trade-
off private benefits of employees against stock price performance. ESOPs are strong deterrents to takeovers 
and that changes in ownership due to ESOPs are associated with negative stock price reactions. See Susan 
Chaplinsky & Greg Niehaus, The Role of ESOPs in Takeover Cases, 49 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1451, 
1451-70 (1994). 
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A similar result holds for ESOP insider trades as shown in the last row of Table 4.  
The mean MAR is positive and significant at the 1% level for all horizons and 
monotonically increasing with the horizon.  Thus our evidence indicates that liquidity 
constraints are unlikely to explain the poor relative performance of pension fund insider 
trades.  Trades by mutual funds (which face potentially even greater liquidity constraints) 
and ESOP profit from insider trades just like other insiders. 
3. Trading strategies 
We also investigate whether the differences between the performance of pension 
fund insider trades and that of all insider trades can be explained by differences in 
investment styles.  We analyze two investment styles: momentum and mean-reversion.81  
A trade is classified as a momentum trade if a purchase (sale) is made after a positive 
(negative) MAR over the six-month period ending in the month preceding the trade date.  
A trade is classified as a mean-reversion trade if a purchase (sale) is made after a negative 
(positive) MAR over the six-month period ending in the month preceding the trade date.82  
Seyhun finds that insiders tend to follow a mean-reversion strategy for both short horizons 
of up to one year as well as long horizons up to five years.83  While the details are not 
shown, for the entire sample of insider trades, about 63% of the trades are consistent with 
a mean-reversion strategy (selling winners and buying losers).  Similarly, when we limit                                                         
81 Momentum refers the finding that recent performance of stocks continues in the same direction for about 
12 months. Mean-reversion refers to the reversal of these patterns over the next three to five year horizons. 
Jegadeesh and Titman report that past six-month winners on NYSE-AMEX continue to outperform past six-
month losers by about 1% per month over the next 6 months. See Narasimhan Jegadeesh, Returns to Buying 
Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency, 48 Journal of Finance 65-91 (DeBondt 
and Thaler document mean-reversions over longer holding periods. They show that a strategy of buying long-
term losers and selling long-term winners would have earned about 25% over the subsequent three-year 
period. See Werner De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor Over-reaction and Stock 
Market Sensationality, 42 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 557-81 (1987). 82 Nejat Seyhun, Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading (MIT Press 1998). 
83 Ibid. 
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the sample to insider trades in firms in which pension fund insider trades occur, about 60% 
of the trades are consistent with a mean reversion strategy.  In contrast, the percentage of 
pension funds trades that can be classified as mean-reversion is much lower (50 – 52%). 
While there appears to be some evidence that pension fund insider trades follow on 
average a different trading strategy than other insider trades, the difference in performance 
cannot be explained by the difference in trading strategy.  To demonstrate this, we compare 
the performance of pension fund insider trades that follow a mean-reversion strategy with 
trades of non-pension fund insiders in firms traded by pension funds since both groups 
seem to follow the same pattern in their investment style.  The mean abnormal returns for 
pension fund trades (unreported) are significantly negative for mean-reversion trades for 
all horizons.  By contrast, the mean-reversion trades of other insiders in the same firms 
earn a significant positive return for all horizons except the 12-month horizon in which 
they earn returns not significantly different from zero.  Therefore, this evidence does not 
provide support to the hypothesis that the differences in trading strategies are the cause of 
the lower profit of pension fund insider trades.84 
                                                        84 We also ran the various tests we conducted to check the robustness of our results. For the sake of 
brevity, we summarize the results of our tests, rather than provide detailed tables. 
a. Performance measured by style adjusted returns  
Style adjusted returns are computed by taking into account size and book-to-market ratios.84  First, 
at the beginning of each year, we classified all firms in the CRSP universe into ten size groups (using NYSE 
market capitalization decile cutoffs) and five book-to-market groups (using book-to-market values computed 
at the beginning of the preceding July). For each month between January 1975 and December 2003, we 
compute the equally-weighted average returns for each of these 50 benchmark portfolios. We then assign the 
firms in our sample into one of these 50 portfolios based on their size and book-to-market ratios. Abnormal 
returns are computed as the difference in returns between the firms in our sample and the matched size and 
book-to-market benchmark groups. 
Using this approach, we find that the mean AR of pension fund insider trades is still negative and 
significant for the two longer horizons (mean AR of −7.2% and −11.9% with p-values less than or equal to 
0.002). The mean AR for the 12-month horizon is not significantly different from zero while the mean 6-
month AR is positive and significant (mean AR of 3% with p-value of 0.000). This is in contrast to the 
performance of all insiders in the same firms with pension fund insider trades; the trades of these insiders 
still earn significant positive AR consistently over all four horizons. 
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4. Alternative and Proprietary Investments in Retirement Accounts 
Alternative and proprietary products can be any investment vehicle that the 
investment sponsor creates.  They can include a bundle of securities that already trade on 
public exchanges.  They can also include structured products whose payoffs are modified 
using leverage, option, futures and other derivative products.  Finally, they can include 
investments in start-ups and other private investment vehicles, shopping malls, residential 
and commercial real-estate, and works of art. The key feature of these products is that they 
do not trade on any public exchanges and the information about them is limited to what the 
sponsor provides.   
There are multiple problems with allowing alternative and proprietary investment 
products in retirement accounts.  One important problem is valuation.  Since these products 
                                                        
The results using the style-adjusted model for the trades of separate accounts and commingled funds 
are qualitatively similar to the results reported earlier. The mean AR for the trades of separate accounts are 
significantly negative for all four horizons and monotonically increasing with the horizon; they vary from −
3.2% for the 6-month horizon to −23.9% for the 24-month horizon. By contrast the mean AR for the trades 
of commingled funds are significantly positive for all four horizons (p < 0.0001); they vary from 15.6% for 
the 6-month horizon to 17.1% for the 24-month horizon. Thus, using the style-adjusted model confirms our 
finding that the conflict of interest hurts the beneficiaries of pension funds.  
b. Performance measured using cumulative abnormal returns  
In addition to MARi,t, we also used cumulative market-adjusted abnormal monthly returns of the 
stock (CAR) starting from the month that follows the trade computed as: 
, 
where  is the with-dividend return to stock i for month t, and  is the with-dividend return 
to equally weighted portfolio of all New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ 
stocks for month t. The parameter h is a defined as before as equal to 1 if the insider trade is a purchase and 
−1 if it is a sale.  
The results using CAR are qualitatively similar to those obtained using AR. The CAR of overall 
pension fund insider trades is negative and significant for all horizons. In addition, CAR of insider trades by 
separate accounts are negative and significant while that by commingled funds are positive and significant. 
c. Volume of trades and performance 
In order to check if the performance of pension fund insider trades is related to the volume of trade, 
the sample was divided into four volume groups based on the number of shares traded: less than 100 shares 
(sample size = 3 trades), 100 to 1000 shares (224 trades), 1000 to 10,000 (1028 trades) shares, and greater 
than 10,000 shares (794 trades). The mean AR for the top three volume sub-groups are negative (and 
significant at the 5% level or better) for the 18 and 24-month horizons. There was no clear relationship 
between the trade volume and the AR. 
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are unique and do not trade publicly in exchanges, it is not possible to observe a market 
determined price or value for them.  Instead, the valuation of the alternative and proprietary 
product is made privately by the owner of the product.  This private valuation creates 
problems both for the taxpayers as well as the retirement investors.  From the taxpayers’ 
perspective, these products can be used to create unfair tax shelters.  For the small investor, 
these products constitute black boxes with no way to peer inside and understand the 
structure, costs, risks and expected returns.   
Some examples would be helpful to illustrate the problems associated with the 
alternative investment products in retirement accounts.  First, we illustrate the conflicts 
created for the U.S. taxpayers.  Suppose that an entrepreneur creates a start-up with an 
expected market value of $20 million. A proprietary investment vehicle is then created 
using all of the start-up assets and 20 billion shares are issued against it.  Consequently, the 
fair market value of these private shares would be $0.001.  However, since is no market 
for this product, the entrepreneur can attach any private valuation on this investment.  
Assume that the entrepreneur makes a small valuation error (in absolute value) and 
privately values each proprietary share at $0.0000001 instead of $0.001.  At this price, the 
entire startup is now valued at $2,000.  The entrepreneur then simply uses $2,000 to put all 
20 billion shares in his IRA account. 
At a later date, say three to five years later, when some or all the proprietary 
investment is offered to the public at the fair market price of $0.001 per share, the IRA 
account balance will suddenly grow from $2,000 to $20 million.  In effect, the value 
increase has taken place in a tax sheltered account, thereby free from taxation.  This tax-
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free wealth can now be consumed or passed to future generations.85  If sufficient time 
passes between when the investment was purchased by the IRA account and when the 
initial public offering took place, it would be difficult if not impossible to determine 
whether the value increase is due to subsequent improvements in the start-up or the initial 
misevaluation.86 
A recent GAO study has found that there are more than 300 taxpayers who own 
IRA accounts with an aggregate value of about $81 billion.87  Thus, the average balance in 
these accounts is over $250 million each.  While all of the IRA balances are fully taxed as 
ordinary income when distributed to the taxpayer, there is an easy way of getting around 
this taxation as well.  After contributing $5,000 to an ordinary IRA account and purchasing 
privately-valued proprietary product, the taxpayer can simply convert this IRA into a Roth-
IRA, pay taxes on extra $5,000 of income and after the valuation step-up, they can enjoy 
the $20 million wealth increase completely tax-free.88 
                                                        85 See the report of the U.S. General Accounting Office, which reports that in 2011 there were over 600,000 
individuals with estimated IRA balances over $1 million, more than 1,000 individuals with an estimated IRA 
balances more than $10 million and over 300 individuals with an estimated IRA balances that exceeded $25 
million.  The aggregate estimated dollar balance of the $25 million + group is $81 billion, which means this 
group could be generating significant tax loss for the U.S Government.  See 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-16, “IRS Could Bolster Enforcement on Multimillion Dollar 
Accounts, but More Direction from Congress is Needed.” 86 The GAO Report states” A small number of taxpayers has accumulated larger IRA balances, likely by 
investing in assets unavailable to most investors—initially valued very low and offering disproportionately 
high potential investment returns if successful. Individuals who invest in these assets using certain types of 
IRAs can escape taxation on investment gains. For example, founders of companies who use IRAs to invest 
in privately traded shares of their newly formed companies can realize many millions of dollars in tax-favored 
gains on their investment if the company is successful. With no total limit on IRA accumulations, the 
government forgoes millions in tax revenue. The accumulation of these large IRA balances by a small number 
of investors stands in contrast to Congress's aim to prevent the tax-favored accumulation of balances 
exceeding what is needed for retirement.”  See Id.  87 Supra note 80. 88 An ordinary IRA account allows the taxpayer to contribute using pre-tax dollars but pay full income taxes 
upon distribution.  In contrast, a Roth IRA allows the taxpayer to contribute from after-tax income, but then 
enjoy all distributions without taxation upon reaching retirement age.  
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Another problem with the alternative and proprietary products arising from private 
valuation is the lack of information regarding their risks and expected returns for the 
retirement beneficiary.  While a complete analysis of the various types of proprietary 
products is beyond the scope of this paper, we examine the potential performance of a 
representative example of these products.  A common feature of these proprietary products 
is to limit downside risk and retain upside potential.  One representative retirement 
investment vehicle we analyze, offers the following features: 
• Protects the principal from market downturns 
• Limits the upside gains to the investor 
• Grows retirement assets 
• Guarantees rising income for the first 10 years of the contract 
• Doubles retirement income potential if no withdrawals are taken for the first ten 
years 
Sometimes these products also explicitly state that there are no fees or commissions 
charged.  In this case, the benefits to the brokerage firm are not zero but they are hidden in 
the terms of product specifying how much the investors participate in the upside.  While 
the details of how these objectives are achieved is not disclosed to the investor, the payout 
structure is disclosed.89 
a. Annual accounting:  Interest is earned based on annual changes in S&P 500 index. 
If S&P is up at the end of the year, interest is credited up to 4% cap.  If S&P 500 
index is down for the year, no interest is earned. 
                                                        
89 These specific parameter values are taken from a specific product offered by an anonymous insurance 
company.   
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b. Monthly accounting:  Interest is based on monthly changes in S&P 500 index.  If 
S&P is up at the end of the month, interest is credited up to 2% cap.  If S&P 500 
index is down for the month, negative interest is earned with no cap.  Interest 
earned at the end of the year is the sum of twelve monthly interest credits with a 
floor of zero. 
A typical investor is completely unprepared to evaluate a complex financial 
investment such as this.  It is not at all obvious whether these are either good investments 
or bad investments.  It is also not at all obvious whether annual or monthly accounting is 
better. 
To analyze the potential performance of these structured products, we ran a 
simulation analysis with one million repeated experiments.  We simulate the S&P 500 
returns using a normal distribution with an annual arithmetic mean of 8% and annual 
standard deviation of 16%, in line with the observed characteristics of S&P 500 returns.  In 
the case of the monthly accounting product, we use the corresponding monthly arithmetic 
mean of 0.67% and monthly standard deviation of 4.7%.  We analyze the performance of 
these structured products over a ten-year investment horizon. 
The simulated performance of both these products is shown in Table 5.  An 
investment of $100,000 in the S&P 500 index grew to a mean value of $215,113 in ten 
years, thus producing a mean geometric return of 6.92% per year.  The same amount 
invested in the structured product grew to $129,114 in ten years, corresponding to a mean 
geometric return of 2.57% per year.  In other words, investors who puts his money in the 
structured product for ten years will, on average, end up with 25% of the dollar return 
compared to what they would have had if they had invested in the S&P 500 index (dollar 
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return of $29,114 instead of $115,113).  They are of course giving up the 75% upside in 
order to buy downside protection: recall that the structured product guarantees the principal 
amount.  The question therefore is whether investors are paying a fair premium for the 
insurance of downside protection.  In this case they are giving up on average 3.35% return 
per year to get downside protection.   
One way to answer this question is to compare the average annual return of the 
structured product to that of the ten-year Treasury bond.  Both the structured product and 
the bond guarantee the principal amount.  The buy and hold return of the bond is fixed 
while that of the structured product is variable as it depends on the return of the S&P 500 
index.  Given that the structured product is risky (in some years the returns can be less than 
the risk-free rate), its expected return should be greater than that of the bond.  During 1962-
2015, only during the last four years has the ten-year Treasury bond yield been lower than 
2.57%, the average return of the structured product.  Therefore, it is difficult to make the 
case that the investor is better off with the structured product. 
The sub-optimality of the structured product is starker when we considered the 
monthly accounting case.  In this case, an investment of $100,000 in the S&P 500 index 
grew to a mean value of $221,716 in ten years, producing a mean geometric return of 7.02% 
per year.  The same amount invested in the structured product grew to $115,993 in ten 
years, corresponding to a mean geometric return of 1.44% per year.  In other words, 
investors who puts their money in the structured product for ten years will, on average, end 
up with 13% of the dollar return compared what they would have had if they had invested 
in the S&P 500 index (dollar return of $15,993 instead of $121,716).  
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The average annual return of the structured product is lower than the Treasury bond 
yield in any of the years during 1962-2015.  In other words, the monthly accounting 
structured product is a dominated asset: The Treasury bond dominates it by providing better 
return at lower risk.  Thus investors would have been better of investing in Treasury bonds 
which is much simpler investment than being induced to purchase the complicated 
structured product they do not fully understand.  It is important to note that the superiority 
of the bond over the structured product is before we take into account transaction costs.  
The buying and selling of Treasury bonds involves minimal transaction costs in contrast to 
the fees and commissions normally associated with the structured proprietary product. 
Overall, when all the facts have been considered, it would be difficult to argue that 
such a product would be in the best interest of any retiree.  Yet, the current rules would 
continue to allow these types of alternative investment products in being offered as suitable 
retirement investments.  What is never reported is the expected annual returns and risks 
from this products.  This is an important piece of information that can help investors in 
deciding whether to invest in this structured product.  However, under the current rules, 
such disclosures are not mandated. 
5. Policy Recommendations 
Current DOL investment advisory rules are internally inconsistent. They require 
that investment adviser act in the best interest of the beneficiaries, yet they also allow the 
advisers to receive income from third parties.  Additionally, the current rules allow opaque, 
non-publicly-traded, alternative and proprietary investments in retirement plans, which can 
lead to taxpayer exploitation, higher fees, and uninformed investment decisions.  Overall, 
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the current rules are likely to lead to continued conflicted investment advice, confusion, 
and wide-spread litigation to sort out these internal conflicts. 
We make three policy recommendations to resolve these issues.  Our first policy 
recommendation is to require that investor advisers to be paid only by the retirement 
beneficiaries.  This rule change is necessary to ensure that the advisers have only one 
principal they serve and thereby avoid the conflicts.  With multiple principals, investors’ 
advisers will be tempted to recommend products that are most profitable for themselves as 
well as the investment sponsors instead of those products that are best suited for the 
beneficiaries.  This likely outcome will be higher risk, higher fees, and lower returns to 
beneficiaries. A consequence will be vastly expanded litigation that will be necessary to 
sort out the conflicts within the current rules. 
Our second recommendation is to prohibit alternative and proprietary investment 
products in retirement accounts.  By their very nature, these alternative and proprietary 
products do not trade in public markets and thus they require private valuation.  Private 
valuation in turn creates multiple problems both for the taxpayers and for the retirement 
beneficiaries.  From the taxpayers’ perspective, private valuation creates potential 
conflicts.  It is easy to undervalue these products, include them in tax-sheltered IRA 
accounts and then enjoy the capital gains without taxation after the market values are 
established.  These potential conflicts can and should be avoided by banning alternative 
investments and proprietary products in retirement accounts and requiring that all 
investments must trade on U.S. exchanges or similarly qualified exchanges. 
From retirement beneficiaries’ perspective, private valuation of non-publicly traded 
assets also creates potential conflicts.  When it comes to alternative and proprietary 
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products, retirement investors are simply pitted against financially sophisticated 
investment advisers and brokers, and they are at a significant informational disadvantage.  
These alternative and proprietary investment products are complex yet there is insufficient 
information to evaluate them.  Furthermore, current rules do not even require the disclosure 
of basic information such as hidden fees, comparison to publicly-available alternatives or 
simulated expected returns.  Without such basic information, informed investment 
decisions are almost impossible.  Second, even if some information is provided, the average 
investor is not financially savvy to process it to properly evaluate these products.  Instead, 
if only publicly traded investments are allowed, investors would be protected to some 
extent by relying on the wisdom of the public markets which have been shown to be 
informally efficient.90  Consequently, we propose that only publicly-traded securities on 
public-exchanges should be allowed to be included in either DB or DC retirement accounts.   
Our final policy recommendation is to restrict the retirement savings to low-cost, 
well-diversified funds such as index funds and ETFs.  To ensure that risk level of the plan 
is consistent with the risk-tolerance levels of the beneficiaries, we further recommend that 
                                                        90 Market efficiency means that price of publicly traded assets fully reflect all available information.  See 
Fama (1970).  The evidence in the finance literature generally supports the concept of the semi-strong form 
of market efficiency. The 2013 Nobel Prize winning economist for his path-breaking work on market 
efficiency, Eugene Fama often regarded as the father of the efficient market hypothesis, wrote in 1970, “We 
shall conclude that, with but a few exceptions, the efficient markets model stands up well,” and “[i]n short, 
the evidence in support of the efficient markets model is extensive, and (somewhat uniquely in economics) 
contradictory evidence is sparse.”  See Eugene F. Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, 25 (1970), pp. 383-417.   In 1991, Fama updated his analysis and 
wrote, “The empirical literature on efficiency and asset-pricing models passes the acid test of scientific 
usefulness.” Eugene F. Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: II,” Journal of Finance, 46 (1991), p. 1576.7 
Eugene F. Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: II,” Journal of Finance, 46 (1991), p. 1576. Although some 
recent studies have uncovered some evidence of anomalous price behavior, numerous peer-reviewed 
academic studies by leading financial economists have largely concluded that these anomalies have 
alternative explanations that are consistent with and support market efficiency. There are a number of such 
surveys.  See: Eugene F. Fama, “Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance,” Journal 
of Financial Economics 49 (1998), pp. 283-306; G. William Schwert, “Anomalies and Market Efficiency,” 
in Handbook of the Economics of Finance. G. Constantinides et al., eds. (Amsterdam: North Holland, 2001). 
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broad age-specific minimums, maximums, and target proportions on large-cap equity, 
small-cap equity, international equities, fixed-income, consisting of corporate bonds and 
government bonds, and publicly-traded real-estate securities should be specified.  The 
target proportions of riskier assets should be reduced as the investor gets closer to the 
retirement age, similar to target-date investments. 91  International equities should be 
restricted American Depository Receipts (ADRs) only. 
The restriction to low-cost well-diversified ETFs restrictions would achieve 
multiple objectives all in line with welfare of the retiree in mind.  First, there is no cost to 
such restrictions. In fact, by only investing in well-diversified funds or ETFs, investors get 
lower trading costs, as well as better risk-return tradeoffs.92  Evidence from practice side 
also shows that low-cost passive index funds in fact beat a large majority of the actively 
managed funds year in and year out.93  Second, the requirement that investors only invest 
                                                        91 Most DB plans have similar restrictions on asset mix. 
92 Academic research provides evidence for the outperformance of passively managed funds over actively 
managed funds.  Sharpe (1991) demonstrates mathematically why passive funds should beat actively 
managed funds after expenses. [Market return is the weighted average return of active funds and passive 
funds. At the same time, market return is equal to passive funds if do not count a few mismeasurement 
problems. Hence, average return of active funds must be equal to market rate to hold this equation]. Active 
and passive funds earn the same returns on average before expenses; however, higher expenses of active 
funds upset the balance for net-of-cost returns. The theory was supported by empirical studies in the coming 
years. Carhart (1997) provides evidence for the lack of managerial skill in mutual funds industry. Positive 
returns in the industry can be explained by using 4 factor Fama- French- Carhart model.  Malkiel (1995, 
2003), and Frino and Gallagher (2001) provide evidence for passive funds’ outperformance of active funds. 
Additionally, Zheng (1999) shows that active fund managers’ objectives are short- termed (money is smart 
only for short term) and funds cannot outperform the market in the long- run.  See Carhart, Mark M. (1997). 
On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. Journal of Finance 52, 57-82; Frino, Alex and Gallagher, David 
R. (2001). Tracking S&P 500 Index Funds. Journal of Portfolio Management 28, Fall; Malkiel, Burton G. 
(1995). Returns from Investing in Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991. Journal of Finance 50, 549-572; Malkiel, 
Burton G. (2003). Passive Investment Strategies and Efficient Markets. European Financial Management, 
Vol. 9, No. 1, 1-10; Sharpe, Wiiliam (1991). The Arithmetic of Active Management. Financial Analysts 
Journal, Vol. 47, No.1, 7-9; and Zheng, Lu (1999). Is Money Smart? A Study of Mutual Fund Investors’ 
Fund Selection Ability. Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 3, 901-932.  
 93 Standard and Poor’s SPIVA U.S. Mid-Year 2016 report states:  “During the one-year period, 84.62% of 
large-cap managers, 87.89% of mid-cap managers, and 88.77% of small-cap managers underperformed the 
S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400®, and the S&P SmallCap 600®, respectively. • The figures are equally 
unfavorable when viewed over longer-term investment horizons. Over the five-year period, 91.91% of large-
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in a select number of well-diversified low-cost index funds or ETFs also eliminates the 
temptation to seek recently hot funds, active money managers, complex alternative 
investments and proprietary products, thus reducing potential conflicts of interest.  With a 
restricted choice set, the role of the financial adviser is limited.  This further reduces the 
incentives and the ability of the financial advisers to offer conflicted advice.  Finally, some 
exceptions to low-cost ETF rule can be considered in special circumstances.  One such 
circumstance is to allow financially-savvy investors to invest in any publicly-traded 
security.  Retirement investors can qualify as financially-savvy in a number of ways, 
including formal education in finance or the size of their investment portfolio which would 
allow them to obtain un-conflicted advice from multiple sources. 
6. Conclusions 
The current DOL regulation regarding fiduciary standard for pension plans and 
IRAs contains two provisions that are potentially not in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries.  First, it requires that investment advisers act in the best interest of the 
beneficiaries, while simultaneously allowing them to receive income from third parties.  
Second, it permits opaque, non-publicly-traded alternative investments and proprietary 
products, which lead to costly and uninformed investment decisions. 
                                                        
cap managers, 87.87% of mid-cap managers, and 97.58% of small-cap managers lagged their respective 
benchmarks. • Similarly, over the 10-year investment horizon, 85.36% of large-cap managers, 91.27% of 
mid-cap managers, and 90.75% of small-cap managers failed to outperform on a relative basis. Over the 10-
year investment horizon, managers across all international equity categories underperformed their 
benchmarks. • The hunt for yield has become increasingly challenging for fixed income managers. During 
the one-year period studied, the majority of managers investing in government and corporate credit bond 
categories underperformed their benchmarks, with the exception of those managing intermediate-term 
corporate credit funds. Funds disappear at a meaningful rate. Over the five-year period, nearly 21% of 
domestic equity funds, 21% of global/international equity funds, and 14% of fixed income funds were merged 
or liquidated. This finding highlights the importance of addressing survivorship bias in mutual fund 
analysis.”, See https://us.spindices.com/search/?ContentType=SPIVA 
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This paper provides direct empirical evidence that these two provisions are indeed 
not in the best interests of plan beneficiaries. These findings support the recommendation 
that broker/fiduciaries must serve only one principal.  The evidence supporting the case for 
independent fiduciaries that serve only one principal is based on the abnormal profitability 
of company-supported pension funds’ transactions in firms in which they acquire insider 
status.  Pension funds are considered as insiders if the pension fund holds more than 10% 
of the shares of the underlying firm or if there is an overlap among the executives of the 
underlying firm and the pension fund.  The fact that a pension fund acquires such a large 
stake in the company of the retirement investors itself signals a potential conflict of interest.   
Our findings indicate that when the pension fund acquires an insider status, 
beneficiaries of the pension funds suffer.  In fact, pension fund managers exhibit bad timing 
in the trades of the underlying firm’s shares.  Stocks tend to underperform after being 
purchased by the pension fund, and outperform after being sold.  The magnitude of the 
abnormal losses for the beneficiaries of the pension funds is large: for pension funds which 
have insider status because of greater than 10% shareholding, the loss is 5.6% after one 
year and 15.0% after two years.  These losses are both statistically and economically 
significant and support the case for un-conflicted, independent fiduciaries.  The key to un-
conflicted advice is to ensure that the investment advisers receive income from only one 
principal and thus serve only that principal. 
Using simulation, we also show that proprietary investment vehicles are likely to 
provide lower returns thereby reducing the retirement savings of beneficiaries.  We offer 
three policy recommendations to remedy these serious problems. 
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Our first policy recommendation addresses the income exemption rule that allows 
fiduciaries to receive income from third parties.  We recommend that regulations be 
modified to insure that investment advisers serve only one principal and therefore receive 
income only from one principal.  Unfortunately, the current rules and the associated 
exemptions have completely failed to address the multiple-masters problem.   
Our second recommendation addresses the transparency issue regarding investment 
products, in particular, in alternative and proprietary investment products.  Without 
transparency, retirement beneficiaries will be unable to make informed decisions about 
their choice of retirement vehicles.  It is our opinion based on the evidence presented here 
that only publicly traded assets should be allowed in either DB or DC plans to address the 
transparency issue. 
Our third policy recommendation is to restrict the retirement savings to well-
diversified funds such as index funds and ETFs.  To ensure that risk level of the plan is 
consistent with the risk-tolerance levels of the beneficiaries, we further recommend that 
age-specific limits on proportions of equity, corporate bonds and government bonds in the 
retirement portfolio be specified.  The proportion of risky assets should be reduced as the 
beneficiary gets closer to the retirement age, similar to target-date investments. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of insider trades by pension funds 
This table provides the summary statistics of trades by pension funds that are classified as insider 
trades. Panel A provides sample statistics on insiders’ trades, classified by insider type: 
Shareholders and Officers.  The fund can be classified as an insider if it holds 10% or greater stake 
in the sponsoring firm (“Shareholder”) or if an officer of the sponsoring firm serves as a fiduciary 
of the fund (“Officer”).  Panel B provides the break of pension fund insider trades by separate 
accounts (pension fund held for employees of a single firm) and commingled funds (a fund that 
holds the pension investments of employees of multiple firms).  
Panel A: Insiders' trades in Pension Funds by Insider Relationship 
  Purchases Sales 
Number of trades 1661 1339 
Shares traded (millions) 131.5 102.6 
Average trade size (millions) 0.079 0.077 
Total shares traded by Shareholders (millions) 121.1 89.4 
Total shares traded by Officers (millions) 10.5 13.2 
 
Panel B: Insiders' trades in Pension Funds by Fund Type 
Fund type Number of firms 
Number 
of trades 
Number of shares 
traded (millions) 
Average number of 
shares traded 
(millions) 
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales 
Separate Account 69 2,220 63.1 35.0 0.030 0.059 
Commingled fund 89 780 68.4 67.6 0.135 0.247    
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Table 2 
Performance of pension fund insider trades 
The table provides the average abnormal market-adjusted returns (MAR) of pension fund trades in 
which the fund is classified as an insider for different horizons. The fund can be classified as an 
insider if it holds 10% or greater stake in the sponsoring firm (“Shareholder”) or if an officer of the 
sponsoring firm serves as a fiduciary of the fund (“Officer”). The abnormal return for each trade is 
computed as 
, , ,
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=
= × −∑ , 
where ,i tr  is the with- dividend return to stock i on day t and ,m tr  is the with-dividend return to an 
equally weighted portfolio of all New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and 
NASDAQ stocks on day t.  The parameter H is equal to one if the insider trade is a purchase and 
negative one if it is a sale. The abnormal returns are computed for 6, 12, 18, and 24 calendar months 
following the trade date. The t-statistics are in parentheses.  Estimates that are statistically 
significant at the 1% level or better are in bold. 
 
 
Number of 
Observations 6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months   
All trades 3,000 -0.80% -0.85% -4.85% -10.54%  
  (-0.25) (-0.97) (-0.99) (-4.55)  
Shareholders 1,521 -1.29% -5.57% -9.89% -15.03%   
  (-0.82) (-2.64) (-4.90) (-7.10)   
Officers 1,479 -0.29% 3.95% 0.28% -5.92%   
  (0.50) (1.31) (3.15) (0.18)   
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Table 3 
Performance of pension fund insider trades grouped by type of fund 
The table provides the average abnormal market-adjusted returns (MAR) of pension fund trades by 
shareholders for two different types of pension funds. Separate accounts account is a pension 
fund held for employees of a single firm while a commingled fund holds the pension 
investments of two or more firms’ employees. The abnormal return for each trade is computed 
as 
, , ,
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where ,i tr  is the with- dividend return to stock i on day t and ,m tr  is the with-dividend return to an 
equally weighted portfolio of all New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and 
NASDAQ stocks on day t.  The parameter H is equal to one if the insider trade is a purchase and 
negative one if it is a sale. The abnormal returns are computed for 6, 12, 18, and 24 calendar months 
following the trade date. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Estimates that are statistically 
significant at the 1% level or better are in bold. 
 
Type of fund Number of Observations 6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months 
 
Separate account 817 -2.65% -7.98% -12.40% -19.69%   
  (-0.97) (-4.27) (-5.68) (-7.22)   
Commingled Fund 704 0.39% -2.76% -7.03% -9.08%   
  (-0.09) (0.24) (-1.56) (-3.25)  
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Table 4 
Performance of trades by insiders other than pension funds 
The table provides the average abnormal market-adjusted returns (MAR) of trades of all insiders, 
insiders in firms with pension fund trades, and insider trades of mutual funds and ESOPs for 
different horizons. The abnormal return for each trade is computed as 
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where ,i tr  is the with- dividend return to stock i on day t and ,m tr  is the with-dividend return to an 
equally weighted portfolio of all New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and 
NASDAQ stocks on day t.  The parameter H is equal to one if the insider trade is a purchase and 
negative one if it is a sale. The abnormal returns are computed for 6, 12, 18, and 24 calendar months 
following the trade date.  N indicates the sample size. The p-values are in parentheses. Estimates 
that are statistically significant at the 1% level or better are in bold. 
 
Type of insider 6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months 
All insiders 2.40% 3.90% 6.09% 6.35% 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 2,205,681 2,133,895 1,913,550 1,779,879 
Insiders in firms with 
pension fund trades 
3.61% 4.62% 6.08% 7.06% 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 30,488 29,901 258,586 27,313 
Mutual funds 3.42% 4.72% 5.78% 8.14% 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 63,298 68,870 55,627 51,746 
ESOPs 1.27% 2.65% 4.04% 7.36% 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 5,907 5,832 5,702 5,619 
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Table 5 
Simulated performance of structured products 
The table provides the simulated results of two structured products described in the paper.  We ran 
a simulation analysis with one million repeated experiments.  We simulate the S&P 500 returns 
using a normal distribution with an annual arithmetic mean of 8% and annual standard deviation of 
16%, in line with the observed characteristics of S&P 500 returns.  In the case of the monthly 
accounting product, we use the corresponding monthly arithmetic mean of 0.67% and monthly 
standard deviation of 4.7%.  We analyze the performance of these structured products over a ten-
year investment horizon for an investment of $100,000.  We report the mean, maximum and 
minimum terminal values of each product and its annual mean geometric return. 
 
Panel A: Annual Accounting 
Invest $100,000 in 
Terminal value Annual mean 
geometric 
return Mean Min Max 
S&P 500 index $215,113 $13,178 $1,630,151 6.92% 
Structured product $129,114 $100,000 $148,024 2.57%   
Panel B: Monthly Accounting 
Invest $100,000 in 
Terminal value Annual mean 
geometric 
return Mean Min Max 
S&P 500 index $227,716 $17,476 $2,287,489 7.02% 
Structured product $115,993 $100,000 $264,421 1.44%   
